[MA] Estimating the Cost of Superposition Attacks on Lightweight Cryptography on Fault-Tolerant Quantum Systems
Estimating the Cost of Superposition Attacks on Lightweight Cryptography on Fault-Tolerant Quantum Systems
The move from personal computers to small resource restricted devices brings with it a whole new set of security and privacy issues. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) launched the Lightweight Cryptography Standardization Process to study and evaluate the performance of current cryptography standards on constrained devices. In March 2021, NIST announced the finalists of the Lightweight Cryptography Standardization Process with new proofs that support the security claims.
But, whether the security claims of these new lightweight cryptographic primitives also hold in a quantum setting has therefore to be evaluated.
In this presentation, a superposition attack on the NIST lightweight standardization finalist Elephant using Simon's algorithm will be presented. It will also be shown, that truncating the output of periodic functions will not constrain Simon’s algorithm which can then be used to speed-up existing attacks. Afterwards, the resource cost of the presented attack will be estimated considering a fault tolerant surface code based quantum computer to demonstrate the differences between powerful quantum adversaries.